Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.09.009MaRDI QIDQ705861zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philip J. Reny, Arthur Robson

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cites work

• A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
• An ``informationally robust equilibrium for two-person nonzero-sum games
• Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3371258 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Information leakage forces cooperation
• Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria
• Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games

Cited in

(11)

• Two-period dynamic versus fixed-ratio pricing in a capacity constrained duopoly
• A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem.
• Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Feigning ignorance for long-term gains
• On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior
• On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games
• Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
• On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
• Presenting an algorithm to find Nash equilibrium in two-person static games with many strategies
• Leadership games with convex strategy sets

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