On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games

DOI10.1142/S0219198918400017MaRDI QIDQ4961342zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Stefanos Leonardos, Costis Melolidakis

Publication date 29 October 2018

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.08888

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamecommitment advantageous gamescommitment optimalcommitment valueNash equilibriumpure strategy equilibriumsubgame perfectweakly unilaterally competitive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Abstract: Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having observed the irrevocable commitment of the leader. Based on a result by von Stengel and Zamir [2010], the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal strategies for each player are discussed as a possible solution concept. It is shown that in non-degenerate bimatrix games (a) pure commitment optimal strategies together with the follower's best response constitute Nash equilibria, and (b) strategies that participate in a completely mixed Nash equilibrium are strictly worse than commitment optimal strategies, provided they are not matrix game optimal. For various classes of bimatrix games that generalize zero sum games, the relationship between the maximin value of the leader's payoff matrix, the Nash equilibrium payoff and the commitment optimal value is discussed. For the Traveler's Dilemma, the commitment optimal strategy and commitment value for the leader are evaluated and seem more acceptable as a solution than the unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, the relationship between commitment optimal strategies and Nash equilibria in $2imes2$ bimatrix games is thoroughly examined and in addition, necessary and sufficient conditions for the follower to be worse off at the equilibrium of the leadership game than at any Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game are provided.

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• Leadership games with convex strategy sets
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Cited in

(4)

• On loss aversion in bimatrix games
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Pure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players
• Leadership games with convex strategy sets

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