On loss aversion in bimatrix games

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9102-6zbMath1198.91015OpenAlexW2095265316MaRDI QIDQ2380520

Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 26 March 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9102-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (5)

On loss aversion in bimatrix games ⋮ A preference foundation for constant loss aversion ⋮ Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs ⋮ Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction ⋮ Reference-dependent aggregation in multi-attribute group decision-making

Cites Work

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• On loss aversion in bimatrix games
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• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• Sources of Bias in Assessment Procedures for Utility Functions
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine

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