Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences

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Publication:1181664

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90039-7zbMath0749.90091OpenAlexW2040582439WikidataQ57925863 ScholiaQ57925863MaRDI QIDQ1181664

Eddie Dekel, Zvi Safra, Uzi Segal

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90039-7




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