Strategic games with security and potential level players

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9036-4zbMATHOpenAlexMaRDI QIDQ995677FDO

Authors Alexander Zimper

Publication date 10 September 2007

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9036-4

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrationalizabilitynon-expected utility theoriesAllais paradoxesequilibrium in beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(2)

• Disappointment-aversion in security games
• Security and potential level preferences with thresholds

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