Potential games: A purely ordinal approach

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00112-3zbMath0983.91004OpenAlexW2008128251MaRDI QIDQ1960569

Nikolai S. Kukushkin

Publication date: 12 January 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00112-3

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumperfect informationpotential gamea maximizer for an order

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (12)

A survey of static and dynamic potential games ⋮ Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Maximizing an interval order on compact subsets of its domain ⋮ On the existence of maximal elements: An impossibility theorem ⋮ Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms ⋮ Perfect information and potential games ⋮ Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential ⋮ Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation ⋮ A potential approach for ordinal games ⋮ ORDINAL GAMES ⋮ Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting ⋮ Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

Cites Work

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• On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Potential games

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