Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
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Publication:1361864
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0129zbMATH Open0877.90092OpenAlexW2048289500MaRDI QIDQ1361864FDOQ1361864
Publication date: 28 July 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3a0f717108bf3cac6b912183caca44d25761176c
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Cited In (68)
- On stochastic independence under ambiguity
- Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
- Support notions for belief functions
- Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality
- Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg
- The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance
- Equilibria in social belief removal
- What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?
- Ellsberg games
- A belief-based account of decision under uncertainty
- Non-additive anonymous games
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach.
- Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
- Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
- Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
- Uncertainty in beliefs and preferences: Conditions for optimal alternatives
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
- Strategic games with security and potential level players
- Choice structures in games
- On the convexity of preferences in decisions and games under (quasi-)convex/concave imprecise probability correspondences
- Zero-sum games with ambiguity
- An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games under ambiguity
- Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
- A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
- Granny versus game theorist: Ambiguity in experimental games
- Ambiguous act equilibria
- Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs.
- Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
- Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
- Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis
- On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations
- An experimental investigation of unprofitable games.
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- An experimental study on the effect of ambiguity in a coordination game
- Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
- Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
- Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals
- Portfolio inertia under ambiguity
- Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
- Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of \(\epsilon\)-contaminated beliefs
- Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES
- Correlated Nash equilibrium
- Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
- Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
- Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
- Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs
- Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals
- Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games
- Robust game theory
- Ambiguous games
- Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?
- Strategic games beyond expected utility
- Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
- Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity
- A strategic product for belief functions
- On the implications of integrating linear tracing procedure with imprecise probabilities
- Dynamic semi-consistency
- On the equivalence of normal and extensive form representations of games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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