Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0095MaRDI QIDQ2365333zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oscar Volij

Publication date 23 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a1b4ee2ec083f5f33286c76d9e09f0ba14866c60

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsmutual knowledge of rationalityNash equilibriumnon-expected utility preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cited in

(24)

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
• Rational beliefs in extensive games
• Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
• An epistemic analysis of the Harsanyi transformation
• A note on mutually absolutely continuous belief systems
• Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality
• A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility
• Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of -contaminated beliefs
• Modeling players with random ``data access
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
• Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• Evidential incomparability and the principle of indifference
• Rationality of final decisions leads to sequential equilibrium
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
• Rationality, strategic uncertainty, and belief diversity in non-cooperative games
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games
• Strategies as states

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