A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
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Publication:2460189
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Non-cooperative games
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games
Cited in
(9)- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Correlated-belief equilibrium
- Utility proportional beliefs
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