A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
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Publication:2460189
DOI10.1007/S11229-007-9217-2zbMATH Open1221.91017OpenAlexW2026974841MaRDI QIDQ2460189FDOQ2460189
Publication date: 14 November 2007
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9217-2
Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
- The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games
Cited In (9)
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Utility proportional beliefs
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
- Correlated-belief equilibrium
- Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
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