A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

DOI10.1007/S11229-007-9217-2zbMath1221.91017OpenAlexW2026974841MaRDI QIDQ2460189

Andrés Perea

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9217-2

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumEpistemic game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (8)

Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ An epistemic approach to stochastic games ⋮ Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium ⋮ Utility proportional beliefs ⋮ Correlated-belief equilibrium ⋮ When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

Cites Work

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• Intrinsic correlation in games
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Non-cooperative games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games

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