A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

DOI10.1007/S11229-007-9217-2MaRDI QIDQ2460189zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andres Perea

Publication date 14 November 2007

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9217-2

zbMATH Keywords

Epistemic game theoryNash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

Consider a finite simultaneous-move game. A strategy in such a game is Nash if it is optimal at some Nash equilibrium. Using an epistemic game theory approach, the paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a single player to choose a Nash strategy. The form these conditions take is: the player believes A, B, and C; the player believes that every opponent believes A, B, C, and D.

Recommendations

• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
• Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality

Cites work

• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Intrinsic correlation in games
• Non-cooperative games
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games

Cited in

(10)

• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
• An epistemic approach to stochastic games
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• Utility proportional beliefs
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Correlated-belief equilibrium
• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
• Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games

This page was built for publication: A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2460189)