Recommendations
Cites work
- A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
- A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Non-cooperative games
- On Non-Walrasian Equilibria
- On non-Nash equilibria
- Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: a framework for robust predictions
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Cited in
(7)- Equilibria in social belief removal
- Endogenous correlated equilibria in noncooperative games
- Belief-based equilibrium
- Bargained-correlated equilibria
- Coordination and correlation in Markov rational belief equilibria
- Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
- Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
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