Correlated-belief equilibrium
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Publication:516246
DOI10.1007/s11229-015-0791-4zbMath1358.91025DBLPjournals/synthese/Tsakas16OpenAlexW791469087WikidataQ59438634 ScholiaQ59438634MaRDI QIDQ516246
Publication date: 14 March 2017
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0791-4
Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
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