On non-Nash equilibria
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Publication:1294032
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0664zbMath0945.91002OpenAlexW2026594420MaRDI QIDQ1294032
Publication date: 1 October 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0664
conjectural equilibriumrationalizable conjectural equilibriumstrong rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
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