Internal correlation in repeated games
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the L-P formulation of zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
- Universal Mechanisms
Cited in
(27)- Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- Repeated games with complete information
- Comparison of information structures
- On non-Nash equilibria
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Mediated talk
- When (not) to publicize inspection results
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- How to play with a biased coin?
- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
- A detail-free mediator
- The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: The Need for Nonstationary Strategies
- Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games
- Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
- Subjective games and equilibria
This page was built for publication: Internal correlation in repeated games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1814186)
