Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01756389zbMath0591.90101OpenAlexW1993025627MaRDI QIDQ1075257

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01756389

zbMATH Keywords

correlation deviceincomplete informationcorrelated equilibrianoisy channelcommunication devicetwo-person infinitely repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: Symmetric case with random signals
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies