Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01756389zbMath0591.90101MaRDI QIDQ1075257

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01756389

zbMATH Keywords

correlation device; incomplete information; correlated equilibria; noisy channel; communication device; two-person infinitely repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games, Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games, Bayesian repeated games and reputation, Intentional vagueness, Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types, Can sunspots replace a mediator?, Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information, A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information, The value of mediated communication, Mediation, arbitration and negotiation, Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences, Mediated talk: an experiment, MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: Symmetric case with random signals
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies