Recommendations
- Reputation in perturbed repeated games
- Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Reputation in continuous-time games
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Reputation and the flow of information in repeated games
- Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
Cites work
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
- Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
- Game theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099353 (Why is no real title available?)
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
- Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study
- Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
- Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
- The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration
- The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides
Cited in
(9)- Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
- Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
- Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
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