Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

DOI10.7916/D8P560QNMaRDI QIDQ3506467zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell

Publication date 13 June 2008

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00845.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(51)

• Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
• Liquidation risks in the Rotemberg-Saloner implicit collusion model
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Repeated games and price wars
• Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
• Flow auctions
• Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
• Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
• On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
• There may be no pass through of a merger-related cost efficiency
• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets
• First-best collusion without communication
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Reputation and impermanent types
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
• Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
• Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars During Booms
• Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 2 games
• Optimal collusion with limited liability
• Robust collusion with private information
• Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
• Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Marginal costs and collusive sustainability
• Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example
• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
• Signal-jamming in the frequency domain
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
• Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
• The value of privacy in cartels: an analysis of the inner workings of a bidding ring
• Favor exchange with private costs: an experiment
• Collusive outcomes in price competition.
• Stationary Bayesian-Markov equilibria in Bayesian stochastic games with periodic revelation
• Bertrand competition with one-sided cost uncertainty
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Strategic experimentation with private payoffs

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