Recommendations
Cites work
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Cited in
(19)- Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
- Endogenous strategic variable in a mixed duopoly
- Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly
- Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example
- Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints
- Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
- Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity
- Competition and collusion with fixed output
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
- Price competition or price leadership
- Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
- On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
- Collusive price can be lower than equilibrium price if there is search cost
- Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
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