Collusive outcomes in price competition.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:698262
DOI10.1007/BF02339582zbMATH Open1054.91532OpenAlexW2102017916MaRDI QIDQ698262FDOQ698262
Authors: Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar 
Publication date: 2001
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02339582
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Finitely Repeated Games
- On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
Cited In (17)
- Endogenous strategic variable in a mixed duopoly
- On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
- Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly
- Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
- Collusion and Price Rigidity
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry
- Price competition or price leadership
- Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
- Collusive price can be lower than equilibrium price if there is search cost
- Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
- Competition and collusion with fixed output
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?
- Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example
- A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
This page was built for publication: Collusive outcomes in price competition.
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q698262)
