Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.004zbMath1242.91119OpenAlexW2049136127MaRDI QIDQ433723

Toshihiro Matsumura

Publication date: 6 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

mixed marketssupply obligationunique pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

Cites Work

• On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
• Collusive outcomes in price competition.
• Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs
• Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
• Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market
• Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Mixed oligopoly, privatization, subsidization, and the order of firms' moves: several types of objectives
• Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs
• Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches

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