Collusion and Price Rigidity
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00286zbMATH Open1096.91006OpenAlexW2148460419WikidataQ57568074 ScholiaQ57568074MaRDI QIDQ4823477FDOQ4823477
Authors: Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell, Chris William Sanchirico 
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63406
Recommendations
- Collusive outcomes in price competition.
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Collusion constrained equilibrium
- Competition and collusion with fixed output
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- The relative rigidity of oligopoly pricing
- Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
- Sustainable collusion on separate markets
- Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cited In (49)
- Dynamic competition with consumer inertia
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Standardization and the stability of collusion
- Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Robust collusion with private information
- Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
- Optimal collusion with limited liability
- Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
- Faking Patience with Tacit Collusion
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Collusive outcomes in price competition.
- Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
- Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity
- Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
- Collusion and cyclic pricing by managers in markets with fluctuating demand
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
- Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
- Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
- Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Repeated games and price wars
- Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
- Excess Capacity and Collusion
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
- Even up: maintaining relationships
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- Money burning in the theory of delegation
- Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
- Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
- Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?
- Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example
- The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
- Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
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