Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.05.024MaRDI QIDQ1670185zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Magdalena Helfrich, Fabian Herweg

Publication date 5 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5786.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionduopolythird-degree price discriminationgrim-trigger strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Price discrimination in Cournot competition
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets
• Price discrimination or uniform pricing: which colludes more?
• Price Discrimination and Monopolistic Competition
• Collusive outcomes in price competition.
• Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model

Cites work

• Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination

Cited in

(9)

• Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?
• Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination
• Price discrimination or uniform pricing: which colludes more?
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model
• The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
• Collusion and customization
• Targeting market neutrality

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