Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.05.024zbMATH Open1396.91439OpenAlexW3123200587MaRDI QIDQ1670185FDOQ1670185

Authors: Magdalena Helfrich, Fabian Herweg 

Publication date: 5 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5786.pdf

Recommendations

• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Price discrimination in Cournot competition
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets
• Price discrimination or uniform pricing: which colludes more?
• Price Discrimination and Monopolistic Competition
• Collusive outcomes in price competition.
• Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model

zbMATH Keywords

collusionduopolythird-degree price discriminationgrim-trigger strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination

Cited In (9)

• Price discrimination or uniform pricing: which colludes more?
• Targeting market neutrality
• Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model
• The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Collusion and customization
• Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?

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