Collusion and Price Rigidity
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Recommendations
- Collusive outcomes in price competition.
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Collusion constrained equilibrium
- Competition and collusion with fixed output
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- The relative rigidity of oligopoly pricing
- Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
- Sustainable collusion on separate markets
- Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Cited in
(49)- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
- Collusive outcomes in price competition.
- Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
- Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
- Collusion and cyclic pricing by managers in markets with fluctuating demand
- Excess Capacity and Collusion
- Money burning in the theory of delegation
- Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
- Dynamic competition with consumer inertia
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example
- Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?
- Optimal collusion with limited liability
- Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
- Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
- Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Even up: maintaining relationships
- Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Standardization and the stability of collusion
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
- Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
- Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
- Repeated games and price wars
- On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
- Robust collusion with private information
- Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
- Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
- Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
- Faking Patience with Tacit Collusion
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