Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.002zbMath1231.91122OpenAlexW2004767705MaRDI QIDQ602967

Yvan Lengwiler, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 5 November 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsprocurementcorruptionbid rigging

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer ⋮ Interim bribery in auctions ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment ⋮ Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion ⋮ Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions ⋮ Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement ⋮ Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
• Delay differential equations: with applications in population dynamics
• Corruption and auctions
• If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
• Interim bribery in auctions
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Collusion and Price Rigidity

This page was built for publication: Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer