Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00840-9zbMath1522.91063MaRDI QIDQ6077277

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 25 September 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

signalingincomplete informationprice leadershiptacit collusionespionageBertrand-Stackelberg games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion

Cites Work

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• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP

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