Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
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Publication:1815584
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0069zbMATH Open0858.90140OpenAlexW2042378555MaRDI QIDQ1815584FDOQ1815584
Authors: Sjaak Hurkens, Eric van Damme 
Publication date: 9 December 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1144895/EDSH5621787.pdf
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- Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
- Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
- On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
- Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
- A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
- Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
- When and what wholesale and retail prices should be set in multi-channel supply chains?
- Commitment games
- On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games
- Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains
- On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
- When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- Games with espionage
- Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
- Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
- Feigning ignorance for long-term gains
- Sequential commitment games
- DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP
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