Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.03.004MaRDI QIDQ281391zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rohan Dutta, Ryosuke Ishii

Publication date 11 May 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesdeterrencedynamic commitmentendogenous timingpayoff dominancestag hunt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• Commitment games
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• Sequential commitment games
• A commitment folk theorem
• The role of commitment in repeated games

Cites work

• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• A commitment folk theorem
• Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
• Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
• Bilateral commitment
• Commitment games
• Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
• Contests with multiple rounds
• Coordination need not be a problem
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Unobserved Delegation

Cited in

(16)

• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• A commitment folk theorem
• Dynamic coordination games with activation costs
• Bilateral commitment
• Commitment games
• Commitment versus discretion in the peasant-dictator game
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• The role of commitment in repeated games
• Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
• Partnership with partial commitment: A game theoretic approach
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• Commitment versus flexibility in enforcement games
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria
• Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making
• Sequential commitment games

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