Commitment versus flexibility in enforcement games

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1833MaRDI QIDQ2867480zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shmuel Leshem, Avraham D. Tabbach

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1833

zbMATH Keywords

strategic complementsStackelbergstrategic substitutesenforcementinspection game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cited in

(5)

• Sophisticated enforcement and adaptive offenders
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Macro meets micro: stochastic (Calvo) revisions in games
• Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses

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