SOPHISTICATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADAPTIVE OFFENDERS

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002976zbMath1237.91053MaRDI QIDQ2883143

Bryan C. McCannon

Publication date: 11 May 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

deterrence; bounded rationality; fictitious play; adaptive play; optimal enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

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