Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study

DOI10.1287/mnsc.42.5.659zbMath0881.90153OpenAlexW2037315690MaRDI QIDQ4363629

Teck-Hua Ho, Keith Weigelt

Publication date: 12 November 1997

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.5.659

zbMATH Keywords

learningfictitious playchoice behaviorcoordination games with multiple equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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