On implementation via demand commitment games

DOI10.1007/S001820050064MaRDI QIDQ1972579zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ani Dasgupta, Y. Stephen Chiu

Publication date 11 April 2000

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050064

zbMATH Keywords

convex gamecoredemand commitment gameShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

A noncooperative game called the Simple Demand Commitment Game (SDCG for short) is studied. It is shown that SDCG implements the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any \(n\)-person characteristic function game. This result is an improvement relative to other proposed models. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy which generates the Shapley value outcomes is also given. As shown for 3-person games, an SDCG can implement the core if the game, convex or not, has a core with a nonempty interior.

Recommendations

• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
• Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
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Cited in

(13)

• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games
• A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements
• A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
• Hart--Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
• Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way
• Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• An experiment on demand commitment bargaining
• An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
• Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
• Implementation of the levels structure value
• Efficient bidding with externalities

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