Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0667MaRDI QIDQ1294030zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandeep Baliga

Publication date 29 June 1999

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0667

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriummulti-stage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910819 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayesian Implementation
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Game theory
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1004315 (Why is no real title available?)
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• Implementation with partial provability
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem

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