Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0667zbMath0937.91022OpenAlexW2088326030MaRDI QIDQ1294030

Sandeep Baliga

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0667

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriummulti-stage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

Cites Work

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• Implementation in differential information economies
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Sequential Equilibria
• Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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