Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0667zbMATH Open0937.91022OpenAlexW2088326030MaRDI QIDQ1294030FDOQ1294030

Sandeep Baliga

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0667

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriummulti-stage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Sequential Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation in differential information economies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (7)

• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On implementation via demand commitment games
• Implementation with partial provability
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem

This page was built for publication: Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1294030)