Efficient investments in the implementation problem

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.04.009MaRDI QIDQ2419597zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kentaro Tomoeda

Publication date 14 June 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10453/133089

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinvestment efficiencyfull implementation\textit{ex ante} investment\textit{ex post} investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• An abstract concept of optimal implementation
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Efficient solutions and bounds on tradeoffs
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Implementation lag and the investment decision
• Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
• Implementation in perfect equilibria
• Efficient allocations under ambiguity

Cites work

• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• First-price auction implements efficient investments
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Investment and Competitive Matching
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
• Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

Cited in

(5)

• First-price auction implements efficient investments
• Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders
• Efficient implementation of the MFS: The three scenarios
• Algorithmic mechanism design with investment
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments

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