Perfect Bayesian implementation
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Cites work
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Bayesian Implementation
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
Cited in
(14)- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- Enriching information to prevent bank runs
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Weak implementation
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