A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.02.003MaRDI QIDQ1779834zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra

Publication date 1 June 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

Maskin monotonicityIncentive compatibilityBayesian monotonicityType diversityVirtual monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms

Cites work

• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Bayesian Implementation
• Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(11)

• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
• Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Segmentation, incentives, and privacy
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments

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