Recommendations
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
Cited in
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- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Segmentation, incentives, and privacy
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Weak implementation
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
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