Virtual Bayesian Implementation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4359769
DOI10.2307/2171883zbMATH Open0898.90013OpenAlexW1964892017MaRDI QIDQ4359769FDOQ4359769
Authors: John Duggan 
Publication date: 1 November 1998
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171883
Recommendations
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
social choicedecentralizationmeasurabilityBayesian equilibriumvirtual implementationBayesian incentive consistencyvirtual Bayesian implementability
Cited In (17)
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Weak implementation
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
- Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
This page was built for publication: Virtual Bayesian Implementation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4359769)
