Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.001zbMath1503.91045OpenAlexW2784223700MaRDI QIDQ2021338

Takashi Kunimoto

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2073

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationmeasurabilityincentive compatibilityrationalizable strategiesrobust virtual implementationfirst-order belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Bayesian Implementation
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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information

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