Robust equilibria under non-common priors
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Publication:969127
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.009zbMath1238.91014OpenAlexW2568226476MaRDI QIDQ969127
Olivier Tercieux, Daisuke Oyama
Publication date: 11 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.009
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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