Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00446MaRDI QIDQ5472985zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Barton L. Lipman

Publication date 19 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00446

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(16)

• From posteriors to priors via cycles
• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Finite-order type spaces and applications
• Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
• The cycles approach
• Monologues, dialogues, and common priors
• Value‐based distance between information structures
• On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
• Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
• Uncommon priors require origin disputes
• Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
• Robust equilibria under non-common priors

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