Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.003zbMath1180.91019MaRDI QIDQ1036567

Paulo Barelli

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge; common prior assumption; universal beliefs space; epistemic conditions for equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

Related Items

The cycles approach, From posteriors to priors via cycles

Cites Work

• Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
• On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
• Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors