Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
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Publication:4319564
DOI10.2307/2951751zbMath0816.90024OpenAlexW2006075621MaRDI QIDQ4319564
No author found.
Publication date: 11 January 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b8054297ed2fd0e7c4837160c7c1528b95a6c62c
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