Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.006zbMath1371.91040OpenAlexW3121234839MaRDI QIDQ308659

Odilon Câmara, Ricardo J. Alonso

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67950/1/Bayesian%20persuasion_2016.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneous priorspersuasionstrategic experimentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (23)

Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment ⋮ Setting an exam as an information design problem ⋮ Slow persuasion ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Conveying value via categories ⋮ Constrained persuasion with private information ⋮ On the value of persuasion by experts ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ Political disagreement and information in elections ⋮ Learning from like-minded people ⋮ Ambiguous persuasion ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

Cites Work

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• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Waiting to Persuade

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