Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
From MaRDI portal
Publication:308659
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.006zbMATH Open1371.91040OpenAlexW3121234839MaRDI QIDQ308659FDOQ308659
Authors: Odilon Câmara, Ricardo Alonso 
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67950/1/Bayesian%20persuasion_2016.pdf
Recommendations
- Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
- Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
- Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach
- Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive
Cites Work
- Stochastic orders
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Agreeing to disagree
- Informational control and organizational design
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- Overconfidence by Bayesian-rational agents
- Weak and strong merging of opinions
- Experimental design to persuade
- A spatial theory of media slant and voter choice
- A Note on the Influence of the Sample on the Posterior Distribution
- Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet
- The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Waiting to Persuade
- Political disagreement and information in elections
- Sequential decisions with tests
Cited In (40)
- Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
- Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game
- A population's feasible posterior beliefs
- Persuasion under ambiguity
- Learning from like-minded people
- Pivotal persuasion
- Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
- Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Setting an exam as an information design problem
- Slow persuasion
- BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Conveying value via categories
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Political disagreement and information in elections
- On attitude polarization under Bayesian learning with non-additive beliefs
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
- Multi-agent persuasion: leveraging strategic uncertainty
- Constrained persuasion with private information
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Rationality-robust information design: Bayesian persuasion under quantal response
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
- Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
- Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Resisting persuasion
- Persuading large investors
- Belief inducibility and informativeness
- A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
- Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of biased beliefs and distributional other-regarding preferences
- Test design under voluntary participation
This page was built for publication: Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q308659)
