Test design under voluntary participation
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Publication:2013374
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.002zbMATH Open1393.91024OpenAlexW2701203531MaRDI QIDQ2013374FDOQ2013374
Authors: Frank Rosar 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.002
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 863806
asymmetric informationvoluntary participationBayesian learningconcavificationfalse positivetest design
Cites Work
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- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Competition in Persuasion
- Stress tests and information disclosure
- Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
- Economic implications of imperfect quality certification
- Test design under voluntary participation
Cited In (9)
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- Slow persuasion
- Informative tests in signaling environments
- Sequential decisions with tests
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
- The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests
- Test design under voluntary participation
- Test Design Under Falsification
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