Economic implications of imperfect quality certification

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90067-UzbMATH Open0825.90124OpenAlexW2076481507MaRDI QIDQ1189347FDOQ1189347

Authors: Sankar De, Prafulla Nabar 

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90067-u

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

Cited In (3)

• Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly
• Nonprofit organizations, free media and donor's trust
• Test design under voluntary participation

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