Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4682740
DOI10.3982/TE1805zbMath1396.91040WikidataQ129741587 ScholiaQ129741587MaRDI QIDQ4682740
Publication date: 19 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (32)
Stress tests and information disclosure ⋮ Persuasion under ambiguity ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals ⋮ Testing, disclosure and approval ⋮ Disclosure in epidemics ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling ⋮ Censorship as optimal persuasion ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents ⋮ Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition ⋮ Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach ⋮ Optimality and fairness of partisan gerrymandering ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes ⋮ Conveying value via categories ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Learning from like-minded people ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions ⋮ Persuading a pessimist: simplicity and robustness ⋮ Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment ⋮ Competitive disclosure of correlated information ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Buyer-optimal extensionproof information ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
This page was built for publication: Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
