Buyer-optimal extensionproof information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105070zbMath1447.91077OpenAlexW2991218674MaRDI QIDQ785542

Cédric Wasser, Stefan Terstiege

Publication date: 7 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105070

zbMATH Keywords

regulationmonopolyinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Information design in optimal auctions ⋮ Experiments versus distributions of posteriors

Cites Work

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• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• Real Analysis and Probability
• The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications

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