Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4614989
DOI10.3982/ECTA13251zbMath1420.91028MaRDI QIDQ4614989
Tymofiy Mylovanov, Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li
Publication date: 1 February 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
experiments; information disclosure; Bayesian persuasion; information design; mechanism design without transfers; persuasion mechanisms
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
Related Items
Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion, Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores, Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues, Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling, Censorship as optimal persuasion, Persuasion with unknown beliefs, Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms, Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents, Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition, Shuttle diplomacy, ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN, Screening for experiments, Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests, Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition, Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships, Computing equilibria of prediction markets via persuasion, Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality, Buyer-optimal extensionproof information, Persuasion under ambiguity, Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production, Pivotal persuasion, False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad, Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying, Learning from like-minded people, Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions, Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion, Resisting persuasion, Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment, Persuasion with costly precision, Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver, Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms, Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game, Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games, Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion, Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure, Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials, On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals, Two-sided strategic information transmission, Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design, Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly, Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough, Disclosure in epidemics, Information design through scarcity and social learning
