Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
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Publication:4614989
DOI10.3982/ECTA13251zbMath1420.91028MaRDI QIDQ4614989
Tymofiy Mylovanov, Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li
Publication date: 1 February 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
experimentsinformation disclosureBayesian persuasioninformation designmechanism design without transferspersuasion mechanisms
Related Items (44)
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