Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms
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Publication:6072236
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105690zbMath1527.91040OpenAlexW4383105304MaRDI QIDQ6072236
Publication date: 12 October 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105690
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