Pivotal persuasion
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Publication:1729672
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.008zbMath1419.91246OpenAlexW4242964253WikidataQ128637077 ScholiaQ128637077MaRDI QIDQ1729672
Publication date: 28 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.008
Related Items (9)
The perils of friendly oversight ⋮ Setting an exam as an information design problem ⋮ Private Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Information disclosure on the contest mechanism ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
Cites Work
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- How to talk to multiple audiences
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- Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
- Public information and electoral bias
- Expert advice to a voting body
- On the value of persuasion by experts
- Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
- Deliberative voting
- Private Bayesian persuasion
- Information acquisition in committees
- Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
- Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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