Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
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Publication:2100097
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1zbMath1502.91013OpenAlexW3208783429MaRDI QIDQ2100097
Publication date: 21 November 2022
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1
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Cites Work
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