Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

DOI10.1007/BF00133169zbMath0848.90140OpenAlexW2022259228MaRDI QIDQ1915817

P. E. M. Borm, S. H. Tijs, Bezalel Peleg, Robert van Heumen

Publication date: 1 July 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133169

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyPareto optimalityconverse consistencyBayesian equilibriaone-person rationalityBayesian congestion gamesBayesian potential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities, A survey of static and dynamic potential games, Modeling, analysis, and dynamics of Bayesian games via matrix-based method, Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information, Characterizing social value of information, Network games with incomplete information, Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution, Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential, Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games, Interactive decisions and potential games, Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form, Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
• Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model