Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2021.09.001MaRDI QIDQ2070570zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stéphane Gonzalez, Aymeric Lardon

Publication date 24 January 2022

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

coreaxiomatizationconsistency principleeffectiveness functionholdover property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(6)

• Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4074848 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reasoning about dependence, preference and coalitional power
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
• Combining control effects and their models: game semantics for a hierarchy of static, dynamic and delimited control effects

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