On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00066-0MaRDI QIDQ1421920zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hans Keiding, Joseph M. Abdou

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00066-0

zbMATH Keywords

effectivity structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Review text

The authors consider game forms which extend the usual games in the sense that assignment of preference relations of players over alternatives determines a game and investigate their solvability regardless of any assignment of such preferences. They associate with the game form a particular structure, defined as a set of potential coalitions having a certain joint power locally, and define the concepts of core and stability for this generalized concept of effectivity functions and also the extended concept of acyclicity. These properties are used for establishing necessary and sufficient conditions of strong and Nash solvability.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(12)

• Interaction sheaves on continuous domains
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• Strongly consistent two-player game forms
• Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics
• Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice
• Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4055415 (Why is no real title available?)
• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 219978 (Why is no real title available?)
• Solvability of Two-Player Game Forms with Infinite Sets of Strategies
• Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
• A stability index for local effectivity functions

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